Introduction
The last decade has witnessed a global popularity of 'creative industries' discourse (Wang 2004 , Kong et al. 2006 , Prince 2010 . While some scholars perceive this as a neoliberal discourse (Miller 2004 , Gibson and Klocker 2005 , Hesmondhalgh 2008 , some see it as generating varied interpretations of creativity and inducing different effects depending on local contexts (Flew and Cunningham 2010) . This debate, which has focused primarily on the discourse's implications for culture and cultural policy, can be summarised as 'Trojan horse or Rorschach blot' (Cunningham 2009 ). This article, however, argues that the discourse has been both Trojan horse and Rorschach blot: it acts as a Trojan horse in the sense that it has paved a way for 'depoliticising' as well as marketising culture and, at the same time, it can be seen as a Rorschach blot because of its 'encompassing' nature. In addition, these two aspects were closely intertwined in the discourse's development and its transnational diffusion. This article further proposes that the discourse's effects will be better analysed when we make clear sense of its link to the new economy narrative. The former shares with the latter the tendency to remove concerns of politics, power, and structural issues from our understanding of the current socioeconomic outlook and imaging of future possibilities. In a similar way, its redefinition of arts and media as economic forces is likely to result in their dissociation from cultural political concerns. Paradoxically, however, such a depoliticisation process is highly political as it mutes ideological questions on both culture and economy while assisting market reasoning in permeating our view of culture. The discourse's encompassing force, which is attributed to the conceptual inclusivity of the term 'creativity', feeds its border-crossing popularity and power to mobilise 'a very disparate and often potentially antagonistic coalition of interests' (Garnham 2005, p. 16) and to be related to a range of different policy options. Although the discourse has so far been situated mainly within the domain of cultural policy, its encompassing and thus undecided scope hints at its potential to act as an economic discourse and to generate a discursive space where participants with dissimilar economic interests and political orientations can interpret existing socioeconomic issues and project future alternatives.
By looking into South Korean variants of the creative industries discourse, this article investigates the discourse's convoluted politics shaped by its depoliticising and encompassing forces that operate on its intersection with the new economy discourse. South Korea (hereafter Korea), one of the East Asian advanced economies and an emerging centre of global cultural industries, is a revealing case in the following two senses. First, the surge of the discourse of 'content industries', an equivalent to the British 'creative industries', at the turn of the new millennium resulted in not only the increased social legitimacy of and public investment in cultural industries, but also these industries' (potential) commercial success becoming a Trojan horse serving for the government's depoliticising narrative of knowledgebased society. Second, the recent couple of years have seen Korea so wholeheartedly embracing 'creative economy' that it is now the country's 'new master economic narrative' (Jessop 2006) . With 'creativity' being hijacked by economic discourse, cultural policy can no longer persuasively argue for creativity's belonging to the culture's domain. Moreover, the extremely inclusive scope of a creativity economy allows the government's neoliberal economic policies to be further justified in spite of critical commentators' discursive interventions in the form of alternative visions of a creative society.
Before discussing the Korean case study, the following section explains the implications of creative industries as a cultural policy discourse, highlighting its connection to the broader context of new economy discourse and its political manifestation, the third-way politics, primarily from the British context. Then, the political and economic transformation of Korean society in the 1990s, especially since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, will be elaborated as an overall background to the arrival of content industries and, later, creative economy discourses. The next two sections inquire into the above variants of creative industries discourse by examining their depoliticising and encompassing forces and the interplay between these two. Then, the article concludes by calling for (re)politicising of the discourse by unpacking the multilayers of its policy of depoliticisation and neoliberal implications and, also by understanding how its encompassing force plays key roles in the discourse's politics.
Making better sense of the creative industries discourse One way to make better sense of the creative industries discourse starts with the comprehension of this discourse's proximity to the 'new economy' discourse that has prevailed in the global north. Either defined as knowledge economy, post-industrial society, information society, network society or post-Fordism, it has served as a 'master economic narrative' in many advanced economies for the past few decades and has provided policy makers with interpretations of contemporary issues and conceptions of potential solutions (Drucker 1993 , Jessop 1996 , p. 167, OECD 1996 , World Bank 1998 , Leadbeater 1999 , Rifkin 2000 , Garnham 2005 . Despite dissimilar theoretical groundings and emphases, the above ideas are common in holding that the current and future advancement of the capitalist market economy relies on the flexible production of symbolic products, such as knowledge and information, and that production would be driven by human capital and would take place in networks of individuals and small firms instead of large-scale factories.
The surging currency of the new economy discourse in advanced economies in Anglophone, Western European and Asia Pacific regions corresponded with the 'cultural turn' in economic and social policies, where the state's structural interventions were increasingly replaced and supplemented by individualised and cultural approaches focusing on mobilising human capital and leveraging the labour market to varying degrees. As many commentators note, such trends were demonstrated clearly by the British Labour government's 'third way' politics, broadly meaning a departure from both '[o]ld-fashioned state intervention' and 'naïve reliance on markets' in Tony Blair's words 1 (Driver and Martell 1998, Giddens 1998) . The third way politics in the British context could be classified as the government's passive strategy to negotiate with neoliberal market forces via policies concerning work, knowledge and skills. The perception of globalisation as a new inevitability that imposes significant limitations on socioeconomic policies at the state level reinforced this strategy (Giddens 1998 , Leadbeater 1999 , Rifkin 2000 , Bourdieu 2002 ). Creativity in this sense was be a concern, especially for social and education policies, and investing in creativity alongside other types of soft skills would be a crucial tool for the state and its public services to mediate between individuals and neoliberal, globalised market forces (Jones 2001) . It is because creativity was regarded as the most tacit form of knowledge, which is deeply embedded in the workforce and could not be easily transferred across borders of nation states and, thus, functions as a crucial source for national competitiveness (cf. Florida 2002) .
Importantly, the close tie to economic narratives has provided the creative industries discourse with a remarkable conceptual broadness, which inevitably leads to unsettling definitional questions. Instead of producing a coherent set of meanings, creative industries have multiple referents which are indicative of key characteristics of the socioeconomic conditions described by theories of knowledge economy, information society, post-Fordism and post-industrialised society.
2 First, according to policy documents such as the UK government's Creative Industries Mapping Document and UNCTAD's Creative Economy Report (2010), creativity is regarded as input in the production process and, thus, creative industries as a collection of industries is driven by human creativity. The second referent is a new mode of economic growth that depends on the flexible production of creative (unique, personal, idea-centred and lifestyle-bound) products, their long-tail distribution, and the rise of consumption driven by symbolic and social motivations (Howkins 2002 , Florida 2002 , Hartley 2005 . Such understanding is supported by an evolutionary view of economic progress, moving from extracting to manufacturing, service, information and then an economy led by creativity. Third, creative industries are associated with a new social mode of economic regulation; that is, the strengthened alliance between expressed creativity and intellectual property rights, knowledge workers' individualised negotiation with capital, and state intervention in the form of investment in human capital (Jones 2001) . In addition, the fourth potential referent would be a mode of societalisation typified with network, connectivity, convergence, public-private partnership, and flexible identity and lifestyle (Leadbeater 1999 , Rifkin 2000 , Florida 2002 , Hartley 2005 .
In these contexts, there were arguments that creative industries should be more inclusively defined and incorporate science, technology and other professional service sectors (e.g. Howkins 2002 , Florida 2002 . Such arguments, however, have not gained big currency and the creative industries discourse in practice has focused on cultural industries and has operated mainly as part of cultural policy. It is within this domain of culture that the discourse, as a Rorschach blot, has exercised its encompassing power, actively embracing and colonising the arts, heritage, craft and traditional/folk culture -the realms that were previously thought to be noncommercial (e.g. UNCTAD 2010). Indeed, national governments, international bodies such as UNCTAD and EU and academic commentators have thus far contemplated creative industries in terms of cultural rather than economic policy with wider economic actors seldom taking part in this policy discussion. While some commentators point to Australia under the Keating government (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) as its birthplace, many agree that the critical moment arrived when the British cultural policy began actively promoting creative industries ('those industries that are based on individual creativity, skill and talent' and 'that have the potential to create wealth and jobs through developing intellectual property'), which consisted of the arts, media and software. Since then, the prime focus of the creative industries discussion in Britain and elsewhere has been the cultural sector. In a way, the idea of creative industries itself was the cultural policy's response to the new economy narrative, and the former has become entrenched within the latter. That is, in spite of the former's encompassing power and conceptual overlap with the latter, their domains have been separated: one being 'cultural' and one being 'economic'.
Creative industries discourse as a cultural policy strategy has economically legitimised the cultural sector and has raised resources for it via public subsidy, investment, promotion and infrastructural support. It has also been useful in increasing policy attention to small-and medium-sized cultural companies and inducing investment in the training of cultural workers (Oakley 2006 , Cunningham 2009 , Flew and Cunningham 2010 . What would be interesting to note is that the discourse works as leverage to bring public and private resources to the cultural sector, which used to be considered a sector consisting of a special kind of economic activities that were difficult to monetise. One example of this view was Baumol and Bowen's cost disease theory (1965) that regarded live performers' artistic activities as productivity-low and costing high thus necessitating external support. Cultural policy makers and scholars alike frequently used this theory to defend state or private subsidy for the arts until the rise of creative industries discourse. Another example would be financial institutions' typical lack of knowledge of cultural businesses and their reluctance to support these businesses. Meanwhile, the creative industries discourse has generated a new, powerful justification for the cultural sector by replacing its market failure with market success and helping the sector gain more access to financial and other resources. The discourse's resource mobilisation for culture parallels third way politics' attempt to channel resources, via policies on human capital, knowledge and skills, to marginal groups and individuals whose activities are difficult to monetise and marketise. These approaches, for example, in the British context, could be distinguished from the straightforward market-centred ones under the conservative government before 1997 and the conservative-led coalition government of today (BBC 2014) .
Despite positive effects and consequences, however, the creative industries discourse, as a Trojan horse, has elements of 'a policy of depoliticisation' that operates in and out of cultural policy. First, the discourse has shared with the new economy narrative and third way politics a discursive position that sees neoliberalising and globalising forces as taken for granted and beyond state control to the point that the state's active, structural intervention is voluntarily submitted to these forces (Bourdieu 2002, pp. 31 and 39, Flinders and Buller 2006) . Within this framework, political characters of socioeconomic problems such as unemployment and poverty are removed as they are individualised and culturalised as the issues of human capital, knowledge and aspiration (Driver and Martell 1998, Giddens 1998) . At the same time, the policy of depoliticisation has corresponded with the economic imperialism (Fine 2000) where economic reasoning fills the void of politics and political debate and traditionally non-market spheres, such as social relation and culture, are increasingly reasoned by economic parameters. It is within this context that the creative industries discourse has been used as a cool and depoliticising descriptor of the contemporary socioeconomic conditions, and has served as a lens through which one can make sense of what the new economy would look like. This lens tends to filter out the disturbing reality where the problems of job insecurity, the casualisation of work, deepening of inequality, soaring housing prices, the decline of wages in real term and the use of credit to fill the gap between production and consumption seriously affect one's social and economic life. Secondly, the discourse's depoliticising effects are clearly felt within the domain of cultural policy as the contemporary discussion on cultural industries -as creative industries -is increasingly losing cultural political concerns; for instance, the concerns with the issue of ownership, cultural and social value and diversity (Gibson and Klocker 2005, also Potts et al. 2008, p. 12) . Unlike 'culture' that carries social and political baggage and is often associated with 'conflict', 'war', 'clash', 'inequality' or 'minority', 3 creative industries are thought to be 'new', 'positive', 'safe' and 'value neutral'. This image of creativity -politically neutral and economically abundant (as everyone could become creative) -strengthens the discourse's encompassing force and helps its transnational travel from the global north to south, and from liberal democracies to transitional economies that have suffered from political and socioeconomic tensions within.
Neoliberalisation and the knowledge-based economy campaign in Korea
In Korea, the discourse of 'content industries', the country's equivalent to creative industries, was born in the turn of the new millennium within the parameter of cultural policy. It was a direct application of the 'knowledge-based economy' idea that prevailed in the country in the late 1990s. In order to fully contextualise the content industries discourse, it is necessary to look into Korea's overall political and economic circumstances since the 1990s. Throughout the decade, the country went through a complex, epoch-defining transformation where political democratisation took place almost simultaneously with economic neoliberalisation. The former gained impetus at the end of the 1980s due to the country's political activism and its achievements, including the restoration of electoral democracy in 1987. The latter began with the civilian government under Kim Young Sam (1993 , who came up with a 'new economy' doctrine that focused on deregulation and internationalisation of the Korean economy and contained a severe critique of the state's regulation over business and financial sectors (Chang 1998, Lim and Jang 2006b) . The government's rapid deregulation of the market -liberating the financial sector and foreign borrowing, the abandonment of investment coordination and mismanagement of the exchange rate -was attributed to a national economic crisis that broke out in 1997 in line with the Asian financial crisis of the same year (Chang 1998) . Ironically, however, the crisis gave the country strong momentum to continue and further neoliberal policies as a consensus -that the crisis had been caused by state-dominated economic management -was quickly established.
It was President Kim Dae Jung (1998 -2003 , a long-time opposition leader, who rebuilt the country by forming a Korean version of third way politics. While promoting a politically progressive agenda including democracy, participation, human rights and a peaceful relationship with North Korea, his government, under heavy pressure from the International Monetary Fund, implemented neoliberal structural reforms that were designed to break down government control over the business and financial sectors, integrate the Korean economy with international financial markets, fully open Korean markets to foreign firms and create a fully flexible labour market (Crotty and Lee 2005, Lim and Jang 2006a) . Such reforms resulted in the financialisation of the economy, the end of lifetime employment, massive-scale redundancies, the casualisation of labour, unprecedented job insecurity, increased inequality, a sudden rise in the number of suicides, family breakdown and the surge of the so-called 'IMF homeless' (Song 2006, Lim and Jang 2006a) . During the post-crisis period, the country saw an advancement of social welfare, mainly the expansion of previously weak social insurances and increased financial support for poor households. Nevertheless, the government approach to welfare ('productive welfare') resonated with that of third way politics in Britain in the sense that it saw the market economy and welfare provision as highly complementary and attempted to link welfare to work (Lee 2002) . The next government leaders followed more or less the same lines of economic and social welfare policies despite differences in their party political positions that defined them as politically liberal (progressive) or conservative.
The socioeconomic transformation starting in the 1990s coincided with the Korean government's enthusiastic championing of the theory of 'knowledge economy' (Drucker 1993 , OECD 1996 , World Bank 1998 , Rifkin 2000 . The shock of the economic crisis in 1997 left a huge void in the country's public policy discourse of economic development as existing beliefs, institutions and the myth of 'the miracle of Han river' were called into serious question. The knowledge economy discourse quickly filled this void and rose to a new 'master economic narrative' for the country (Jessop 2006) . Policy makers firmly believed that postindustrialisation and globalisation, as a new inevitability, left the country no option other than advancing an economy founded on knowledge, which could be mobilised without large-scale capital investment and would be less affected by rising competition from newly developing economies such as China. The post-crisis government, therefore, adopted a 'knowledge-based society' as one of its six key objectives and analogised it with 'nation rebuilding' (P.-D. .
Here, the potential meaning of knowledge was wide-ranging: information, communication, an input into the production process, an output of such a process, a marketable product and a tacit knowledge rooted in the workforce. Despite the vague signification of knowledge, the narrative provided Korean policy makers with a discursive solution to the country's economic crisis by interpreting the crisis, legitimising the government's chosen policy actions and injecting new, optimistic visions into society (Jessop 2006) . The discourse had strong depoliticising elements: it understood neoliberal, globalising forces as irresistible, and reduced the issues of economic governance and wealth redistribution into those of exploring new sources of income generation via enriching human capital. What is more, policy makers rarely asked political questions around knowledge itself; for example, why certain types of knowledge -whose knowledge or knowledge found in which sectors -would be selected as useful for the new economy, who would invest in it and how, and who would benefit (Mokyr 2002) . At the same time, there was little concern with the contradictory nature of knowledge itself: as a public good and as exclusive intellectual property. Meanwhile, this period witnessed a serious absence of alternative policy discourses as both conservative and progressive sections of society were struggling to make sense of the economic crisis that the country was going through.
In practice, the knowledge economy translated into two different types of public policy. First, it was narrowly understood as technology-driven industries which became the main beneficiaries of government policy measures in this area. Cultural industries too were taken as part of this emerging economic field. Specifically, their potential profitability was oft compared with that of manufacturing sectors on which the country's economy had traditionally relied. As the next section shows, it was culture's linkage to the technology-driven knowledge economy where the convergence between culture and technology was taken for granted and constituted the core understanding of content industries. Second, the knowledgebased society was broadly interpreted as a society where every citizen would be a knowledge worker ('new intellectual' in the Korean expression). 4 The high-profile 'knowledge worker campaign' that was initiated in 1998 by the then President himself is a good manifestation of such interpretation. In this campaign, the government contended that everyone could become a knowledge worker who adds value using knowledge and innovates their own job by developing and applying new ideas. Cultural producers, along with those from other professions, were cited as examples of knowledge workers. Similar to 'the creatives' in the British context, knowledge workers would be entrepreneurial subjects who would embody a certain set of morals (e.g. be passionate, innovative and risk-taking), possess professional knowledge and acquire new knowledge such as the English language and computer skills (H.-C. . Such emphasis on individuals' knowledge, innovation and creativity -or 'culture' in its very broad sense -as a cure for socioeconomic issues was one of the core themes of third way politics in Britain and Korea. In spite of strong elements of a policy of depoliticisation, the knowledge-based society narrative in Korea attempted to endorse innovative potentials of and mobilise resources for individuals and groups whose activities would be difficult to commodify. President Kim Dae Jung's idea of knowledge workers, for instance, embraced even those who were at the bottom of the social ladder: a famous example was a food delivery man who added fun and innovative elements to his otherwise menial job.
Content industries: culture attached to new economy
The fact that policy makers took culture as an exemplary knowledge sector hints at the content industries discourse's attachment and entrenchment into the new economy idea. Two key factors fostered this unprecedented conceptual convergence between culture and economy in Korea. The first one is the successful commercialisation of the country's popular culture and its potential profitability. The country's cultural industries, such as the film and music industries, firmly established themselves as commercial sectors in the 1990s with the decline of state censorship and regulation. This process was driven greatly by the arrival of a consumer society, the expansion of the cultural market, the diversification of cultural commodities and the input from a new breed (well-educated, sometimes overseas-studied and business-savvy) of cultural producers and managers. In short, even before the government began promoting cultural (content) industries, the country was equipped with key constituencies of these industries: deregulated cultural producers, their enhanced understanding of market forces, commercial businesses' increasing consciousness of the changing lifestyle of Koreans, young generations who enjoyed material wealth and freedom of choice and the diversified and sophisticated popular tastes.
The second factor was the government's embrace of the rhetoric of culture in its vision of the new economy, and the consequent increase of public support for cultural industries. . Until the early 1990s, combining culture with economy was foreign for most Koreans, but they quickly adapted without casting serious doubt. The emerging consensus on culture as an economic domain was substantially consolidated with the rise of the Korean wave phenomenon, referring to the growing overseas demand for Korean pop cultural products throughout the 2000s. This period witnessed the current and future profitability of cultural industries becoming a popular 'lens' through which Korean society could envisage and comprehend the country's new economy.
Paradoxically, the economic turn in cultural policy came with the government's unprecedented promotion of and support for popular culture, first under the name 'cultural industries' and then 'content industries'. The continuing expansion of policy in this area took place when the country's public policy as a whole was subjected increasingly to neoliberal thinking. This was attributed to the prevalence of a developmental approach to culture and the state's leadership and power to deliver resources. These institutional characteristics of Korean cultural policy, which can be found in some East Asian countries as well, were still intact despite the neoliberalisation trend. In fact, the country's neoliberalisation process itself was steered heavily by the state via institutional reforms and resource redistribution. Thus, one can find recognisable differences in the British creative industries policy and its Korean equivalent despite their contextual and discursive similarities. While the former focused on promoting the idea itself, the latter resulted in significant changes in the country's cultural policy framework, cultural infrastructure and cultural financing. One key moment in Korea was in 1999 when the Cultural Industries Promotion Basic Law (1999) was enacted to declare the state's responsibility for the promotion of cultural industries, which were defined as industries that produce and distribute 'cultural commodities' that embody cultural elements and generate added economic value, ranging from media, traditional craft, traditional costume to food. From 2003, the definition widened to include various types of 'content' (data or information of symbol, text, voice, audio and screen image). Over time, the government focus shifted from 'cultural' to 'content' industries as indicated by the transformation of the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism's Cultural Industries Directorate, set up in 1994, into the Cultural Content Industries Directorate in 2008.
Similar to Britain's 'creative industries', the meaning of content industries was inclusive and flexible enough to include noncommercial arts and cultural activities without facing serious resistance. The arts community was sceptical about this new policy discourse but eventually accepted its encompassing power. It is because the community saw the discourse as a new justification for public subsidy for the arts as the 'root' or 'base' of marketable content. Perhaps the lack of a middle class cultural hegemony and patronage for arts explains why the content industries discourse's colonisation of arts was so easily embraced by Korean society in such a short time period (Lee 2012) . The discourse quickly absorbed and colonised traditional culture and history by redefining them as 'an archetype of story and character' and 'the source of such archetypes' that could be valorised through multiple methods, especially via digitisation and various 'cultural technologies', that is, technologies that are used to add value to culture and transform it into profitable cultural content. This led the Korean Culture & Content Agency (KOCCA)'s to focus initially on investing in digitising traditional stories (myth, legend, folk stories and history), images, music, dance, martial arts and costumes for the clear purpose of commercial exploitation. Similarly, numerous local governments began holding 'storytelling competitions' based on motifs of local history, culture and tradition with the intent of copyrighting and putting the stories in story deposits so that cultural companies could easily buy them to create new products. In this way, culture would be separable from human agency and social life, therefore losing its tacit and embedded characters. Policy makers' obsession with character development and storytelling could be attributed to their admiration for the commercial success of Japanese and American cultural industries that rely on cross-media storytelling and product development. Consequently, comics, animation and mobile content industries constituted the core clients of the KOCCA while other areas such as contemporary architecture, design and fashion were not seriously considered within the framework of content industries.
5 Thus, it was not surprising that Koreans understood the British creative industries mainly in terms of the storytelling power of successful franchises such as Harry Potter.
The newly emerging policy in this area included legislation, planning, mobilisation of financial resources and the establishment of new governmental agencies to support commercial cultural sectors via funding, education and training schemes. For example, the Cultural Industries Promotion Basic Law (1999) was followed by to finance pre-production, distribution, the modernisation of infrastructure, digital content development and export in the form of loans, indirect investment and fora (Lee 2005) . Spending continued to grow to 361.9 billion won (US$338 million) in 2006 and 534.3 billion won (US$499 million) in 2012 (Park 2012, pp. 314-315) . 6 In addition, various centres and festivals were set up with support from central or local governments to provide infrastructural support to the industries, with examples being audio-visual centres, comic museums, publishing villages and animation festivals across the country.
In spite of these positive effects, the economic approach to culture resulted in its depoliticisation at varying levels. Throughout the democratisation process, popular culture served as a site of politics and culture-specific issues such as artistic freedom, independent journalism and the cultural identity of 'divided Korea' were discussed alongside the broader democratic agenda. However, the gradual fading of political activism, the maturing of the consumer society and the commercialism in cultural industries led to popular culture's dissociation from progressive agendas (Kang 2007) . As society consolidated commercial consensus around cultural industries, it became very difficult to bring cultural politics to policy for these industries. Although the liberal (progressive) governments (1998-2003 and 2003-2008) tried to raise issues of diversity, accessibility, decentralisation and democratic decisionmaking with their content industries policies, the attempt was dwarfed by policy makers' attention to the quantitative expansion of those industries (Lee 2005) . The conservative government further reinforced this trend from 2008 until 2013. The content industries discourse's depoliticising power was also found in its imagining of these industries as an apolitical sphere where sectoral politics and tensions would not exist. Korea had long suffered from ideological division within, a legacy of its turbulent historical trajectory molded by the Korean War, military dictatorship, the rise of progressive politics, and the conservative groups' reactionary response to it. Thus, tensions between political conservatism and progressivism was a distinctive attribute of various social sectors, including the cultural sector, and their relationship to the government: for example, policy making for the arts and film sectors was tied up by such legacy (Lee 2012) . It was against this backdrop that the content industries discourse provided a discursive solution to the existing schism in the cultural sector by generating a sectoral consensus on the valorisation of culture and the active embracing of digital technologies.
Politics of 'creative economy': creativity hijacked by the new economy The recent couple of years has seen a noticeable turnaround in Koreans' perception of creative industries with the arrival of 'creative economy' as an economic policy discourse. As a revamped discourse of the new economy, creative economy is not confined to the cultural domain, puzzling cultural policy makers who have so far confidently believed that 'creative' industries is another name for content industries, and vice versa (e.g. Creative Korea report published in 2004 by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism). With creativity becoming the main descriptor of the new economy, the country's cultural policy now seems to struggle to affirm culture's safe footing in the government's overall economic policy framework, where culture's roles are little recognised.
The idea of a creative economy arose during the presidential election campaign of 2012. It was coined by the ruling, conservative Senuri Party's candidate, Park Guen Hye, who proposed it as the party's prime strategy to revitalise the country's economy. As she won the election, it became the new government's (2013-2018) master economic narrative and started to exercise an extreme and unprecedented degree of encompassing power. This was initially caused by the lack of clarity in the government's own understanding about what a creative economy would mean: a selected set of industries, an overall transformation of the country's economy towards a creativity driven one, or both. Under such circumstances, varying actors representing dissimilar economic interests and policy priorities joined the debate on how this new economy should be defined and which sectors should be its main constituents. For example, the country's software, science, automotive, agriculture, food, retail and many other industries were keen to highlight their creativity and claim their role within the new economy. The discourse's encompassing power further expanded due to the government's capacity to provide resources and reshape the policy framework. Predicting that this new economy discourse would bring about substantial institutional changes and resource mobilisation, many sections of society -the cultural sector being merely one of them -kept an eye on how the idea of a creative economy would pan out in practice and tried to take any opportunities that arose. This is why the slogan of the creative economy, despite its conceptual vagueness, has begun generating immense discursive power and is already serving as a key reference point for public policy discussion in the country.
One way to make sense of the creative economy discourse is to understand its path dependency, meaning that the country's past experiences and existing sectoral interests are likely to shape this area of policy. Indeed, the emerging policy for creative economy shows a striking resemblance to that for knowledge-based society to the degree that the former could be viewed as a recycling of the latter. The current situation looks similar to the situation found at the end of the 1990s when the government gave a huge discursive and financial boost to technology-based industries, leading to a dotcom and IT venture boom that eventually could not sustain itself for long. While there still exists a vagueness around the meaning of a creative economy, the government has begun adopting a wider definition of creativity that puts science and technology at its core (Howkins 2002; Florida 2002 ) and re-appreciating the British idea of creative industries from this perspective. For science, technology and R&D sectors, the arrival of the new discourse signals an opportunity to refresh public interest/investment and to reiterate their legitimacy as key engines of the national economy. The book The Start-up Nation: The Story of Israel's Economic Miracle (Senor and Singer 2009) was influential in this process since its translator, an IT expert, became a minister for the Ministry of Science, ITC and Future Planning, shaping the contours of the country's creative economy debate and promoting the importance of R&D. The path dependency also explains why policy makers are easily persuaded to look westward to Israel, a country the existing literature on creative industries seldom mentions, as a model of a creative nation. Policy makers and business leaders launched a 'learn Israel' campaign and began to set up funds imitating Israel's venture capital funding strategies for R&D sectors. The Ministry of Science, ITC and Future Planning's (the literal translation of the ministry's Korean name is 'Ministry of Future, Creativity and Science') announcement hints that the policy's main beneficiaries would be the abovementioned sectors: it would invest US$8 billion primarily in these areas over the next five years via introducing new initiatives/investments and repackaging existing ones (MSIFP 2013b).
More evidence of creative economy's direct link to the knowledge-based society narrative of the past is its discursive campaign element exemplified with projects targeted at the whole nation. For instance, the newly launched 'creative economy town' reminds us of the 'knowledge worker' campaign in the late 1990s in that both aim to grow a new type of workforce that is entrepreneurial, innovative, selfmotivated and risk-taking and, thus, capable of prospering in the contemporary economic life. In a similar vein, the aforementioned ministry is collaborating with other ministries, such as the education ministry, to offer various programmes designed to increase creativity, entrepreneurship and the software skills of current and future workforces.
Like the knowledge-based society, the creative economy discourse can be understood as the government's passive and depoliticising discursive solution to the pressing socioeconomic problems caused by the deepening neoliberalisation of the Korean society. The symbiosis of these two discourses, however, is a complex one as the latter might be a further depoliticised version of the former. Although the creative economy discourse entails some concerns with tackling socioeconomic issues through mobilising and disseminating creativity, these seem to remain merely rhetorical. Instead, the agenda of the business community, and more recently that of the financial sectors in particular, have shaped policy discussion. Conservative and pro-market commentators relate a creative economy to economic growth (prioritised over wealth redistribution) that benefits from deregulation and privatisation. For instance, the country's biggest business associations see this economy as business friendly and less regulated: they demanded the government's withdrawal from its plan to make laws allowing 'over-regulation' (e.g. extending the working age, legalising substitute holidays and providing more social security to workers), arguing that these changes would harm the country's creative economy (Dong-A Ilbo 2013 , Joongang Ilbo 2013 . Still, different sections of the business sector have dissimilar and even contrasting ideas for the key constituents of this economy; for example, R&D firms of small and medium scale vs. Chaebols such as Samsung. This debate reflects the business community's conflicting views of Chaebols' role in economic development (from 'villains' to 'saviours'), which has been one of the hottest topics for economic policy debate in the country since 1997. The emerging policy in this area, however, hints that a consensus is forming that the policy's focus should be financing start-ups. With this regard, the Ministry of Science, ITC and Future Planning's Creative Economy Action Plan (2013a) and the OECD Economics Department Working Paper 'Fostering a Creative Economy to Drive Korean Growth' (Jones and Kim 2014) are revealing. The ministry's plan demonstrates that, in spite of its rhetoric of using creativity to solve social problems (this is resonant with the third way politics), its main point is leveraging venture capital investment on R&D and technology start-ups, deregulating stock market and M&A, and facilitating the convergence between ITC and traditional industries. The plan's concern with the cultural sector is geared clearly towards activities with strong commercial prospects. Pop music, film, games, animation/character, musical and digital content industries would benefit from government-supported and privately managed venture capital funds such as Digital Contents Korea Fund and Proud Contents Korea Fund. The OECD paper comments more exclusively on the country's economic policy. Its proposal can be summarised as follows: in order for the country to develop a creative economy, certain prerequisites are required, such as product market deregulation, free trade, labour market flexibility and expanded venture capital financing. Furthermore, the paper claims that the country can increase its labour productivity via creativity and innovation that have potential to generate high profit for financers. This indicates a very selective and narrow view of creativity -as a specific type of human capital that can yield high return on investment. It goes on to argue that there should be more labour flexibility in start-up sectors, allowing investments to be easily shifted towards more 'creative' (profitable) firms. It is difficult to know how much the Korean government would follow the OECD working paper's proposals; however, the proposals seem to be in line with the government's neoliberal agenda to boost the financial sector and encourage health sector privatisation, which are discussed and justified increasingly within the framework of creative economy, where culture and the arts are hardly visible (Yonhap News 2014).
Facing a new wave of neoliberal policies in the name of 'creative', critics of neoliberalism have attempted interventions by presenting an alternative vision of a creative economy: a society characterised with better social welfare, more job security and increased social equality. Their view is that, without an adequate level of living conditions and social security, individual and social creativity would hardly be realised and there would be no creative economy (Lee 2013) . For these critics, therefore, the best route to such an economy would be the government's active addressing of the problems caused by the neoliberal social transformation, and the pursuit of an economic democracy broadly meaning more justice and equality in wealth redistribution and strengthened social welfare. It is not clear how far critical commentators buy the idea of creative economy itself; however, they are using this popular rhetoric to engage media and policy makers in their agenda. For the general public of Korea, it seems difficult to imagine a welfare society as their future because some see it as 'someone else's past' and some relate it to 'leftist' politics, which are treated as a taboo subject. Therefore, critical commentators' (reluctant) participation in the creative economy debate seems an inevitable choice for them. As the debate is ongoing, it is difficult to know if the alternative imagination would result in a potential disruption to the depoliticising and neoliberalising power of this encompassing discourse; however, such an effort to (re)politicise the discourse is worth further observation and analysis.
Currently, the country's cultural sector is in a thorny position. In the past, the content industries discourse neatly submerged in the knowledge economy narrative, with culture and economy actually being two separate policy areas. The current government's merging of creativity and economy, however, is not only producing unprecedented conceptual confusion around creativity but is also taking creativity from cultural to economic (and financial) domains. Now culture hardly serves as a popular lens with which society can portray a creative economy; and the discourse of the latter does not necessarily bring new resources or public support for the cultural sector. At the same time, the cultural sector is uncertain about how it can participate in the current debate of creative economy, which is preoccupied with socioeconomic interpretations of creativity. Anticipating that the government's creative economy policy would lead to a recurrence of the boom seen in technologybased ventures, cultural policy makers are trying to assert culture's place at the core of the new economy (e.g. increasing cultural exports to US$10 billion and the sector's employment to 690,000 by 2017) via fostering convergence between culture and ITC, expanding content industries, assisting the Korean wave and boosting sports as a lucrative industry (MCST 2013) . The cultural sector's dilemma, however, will continue as such a strategy of attaching culture to technology and economy will increase the difficulty of bringing 'creativity' back to the realm of culture.
Conclusion
The creative industries debate so far is encapsulated as 'Trojan horse or Rorschach blot' (Cunningham 2009 ). This article views these forces as two sides of the same coin and attempts to further comprehend them via investigating the discourse's depoliticising and encompassing nature. Unlike the existing literature that tends to focus only on the cultural sector and cultural policy, this article proposes that a critical assessment of the discourse should take a broader scope and be carried out on the discourse's intersection with the new economy discourse and related public policies. Within this intersection, one can observe how the ideas of creative industries and new economy interplay, with the former serving as a discursive means with which the latter is described and imagined.
The existing critique of the creative industries discourse is concerned mainly with the discourse's neoliberal and marketising effects. While sharing the same concern, this article has highlighted the policy of depoliticisation (Bourdieu 2002) as both agent and consequence of neoliberalisation: the void in politics facilitates market imperatives; and commercial consensus prevents politics from being brought back. Depoliticisation is found within the overall trend of economic management and public policy, where the idea of a knowledge-and creativity-led economy has gained currency. It also refers to the weakening link between culture and politics. In addition, it takes place within the cultural sector itself in the form of cultural discussion's increasing decoupling from cultural political concerns such as power, value and diversity. This article proposes that a critical assessment of the creative industries discourse necessitates the unpacking of its depoliticising nature. Perhaps one of the potential themes for such an assessment is the discourse's own understanding of human creativity as a key source of wealth generation. Yet, its political implications (for example, how we should value human labour where creativity is embedded in its tacit form, within the framework of economic governance that conditions the negotiation between capital and labour and the redistribution of wealth in society) seldom have been explored. Korea's creative economy discussion vividly shows that from the lack of politics in deliberating human creativity itself emerges its extremely selective interpretation as high productivity and, thus, high return for financial investors. One can also see, from the Korean experience, relying too much on economic reasoning to legitimise culture and state cultural support would be a highly risky strategy for cultural policy.
Another point of this article is that the discourse's role as a Rorschach blot and its encompassing effects should be considered within the context of the discourse's politics. The examination of the discourse's Korean variants indicates that their depoliticising power often operates via their encompassing force, and the latter brings about a discursive space -both within and beyond cultural policy -where more depoliticisation could take place and neoliberal policies are further legitimised. At the same time, the discourse's encompassing nature implies the development of the discourse needs to be understood within its cross-national settings. So far, the prevailing assumption has been that the discourse originated in the Western (British and Anglophone) context and was adopted by various sites such as China, Brazil and Korea with certain twists. While being acknowledged for providing global perspectives, these sites have been treated as the local where the original ideas are copied, contested, filtered and modified according to indigenous agendas and interests. This article, however, challenges such a perspective by pointing out that the discourse's encompassing scope and power can be captured only via the observation of multiple interpretations of creativity and, thus, varying practices of related policies across different countries. (Jessop 1996, p. 252) . 3. The following expression or combination of words produced a large number of hits in a google search carried out by the author on 17 June 2013: 'cultural conflict' (383,000 hits), 'cultural war' (1,460,000), 'culture' + 'inequality' (14,400,000), 'culture' + 'clash' (32,200,000), 'culture' + 'minority' (23,600,000). Meanwhile, 'creative industries' and the combination of words 'creative' and 'industries' produced 4,810,000 hits and 73,700,000 respectively. 4. Policy makers carefully chose the term 'intellectual' instead of the term 'worker' or 'labourer' as they were afraid that the latter would have connotation of leftist politics, which were still taboo in the country and, therefore, could cause unnecessary ideological debate. 5. Recently the KOCCA merged with governmental agencies for gaming and broadcasting industries, expanding itself as the Korea Creative Content Agency maintaining KOCCA as its acronym. 6. The Korean won to US dollar as of 30 March 2014 is applied. The percentage of the ministry's spending on cultural industries among the government's total public spending between 1997 and 2012 also noticeably increased from 0.016 to 0.173%. Similarly, the percentage of the ministry's spending on cultural industries among its total spending increased from 1.7% in 1997 to 14.4% in 2012 (Park 2012, pp. 320-323) . 7. See The Economist's article 'South Korea's industrial giants: the Chaebol conundrum' and the BBC news report 'Chaebol debate rages in South Korean election' (accessed 1 February 2014).
